| 1 |
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| MODULE = Punk::SAML PACKAGE = Punk::SAML::Response |
| 2 |
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| |
| 3 |
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| # verify($bytes, %opts): the decoded XML in, an identity hashref out, or a |
| 4 |
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| # Punk::SAML::Error thrown. |
| 5 |
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| # |
| 6 |
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| # No application and no request. The ACS route in phase 8 is a thin |
| 7 |
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| # wrapper that supplies now, acs_url, entity_id, the keys and the flow |
| 8 |
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| # from configuration; `punk saml verify` is another; and the suite is a |
| 9 |
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| # third, running this a thousand times with none of the three. |
| 10 |
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| SV * |
| 11 |
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| verify(class, bytes, ...) |
| 12 |
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| SV *class |
| 13 |
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| SV *bytes |
| 14 |
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| ALIAS: |
| 15 |
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| _verify_field = 1 |
| 16 |
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| CODE: |
| 17 |
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| HV *a; |
| 18 |
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| psaml_checks o; |
| 19 |
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| SV *v; |
| 20 |
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| int i; |
| 21 |
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| PERL_UNUSED_VAR(class); |
| 22 |
397 |
▶ | if ((items - 2) % 2) |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if ((items - 2) % 2) |
0 |
397 |
397 |
|
| 23 |
0 |
| croak("%s: Response->verify takes bytes and a list of pairs", |
| 24 |
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| PSAML_WHO); |
| 25 |
397 |
| a = newHV(); |
| 26 |
397 |
| sv_2mortal((SV *)a); |
| 27 |
3053 |
▶ | for (i = 2; i + 1 < items; i += 2) { |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| for (i = 2; i + 1 < items; i += 2) { |
2656 |
397 |
3053 |
|
| 28 |
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| STRLEN kl; |
| 29 |
2656 |
| const char *k = SvPV_const(ST(i), kl); |
| 30 |
2656 |
| (void)hv_store(a, k, (I32)kl, newSVsv(ST(i + 1)), 0); |
| 31 |
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| } |
| 32 |
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| |
| 33 |
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| /* _verify_field is verify with the transport in front of it: the |
| 34 |
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| * size cap on the ENCODED field, then the strict base64. It is an |
| 35 |
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| * ALIAS rather than a wrapper that re-enters verify through |
| 36 |
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| * call_method - the wrapper was written first, and pushing the |
| 37 |
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| * caller\'s own arguments back onto the stack it was reading them |
| 38 |
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| * from produced a freed-string panic. One body, two names. */ |
| 39 |
397 |
▶ | if (ix == 1) |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if (ix == 1) |
40 |
357 |
397 |
|
| 40 |
40 |
| bytes = sv_2mortal(psaml_decode_field(aTHX_ bytes, |
| 41 |
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| psaml_opt_iv(aTHX_ a, "max_response", 262144))); |
| 42 |
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| |
| 43 |
397 |
| Zero(&o, 1, psaml_checks); |
| 44 |
397 |
| v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "idp"); |
| 45 |
794 |
▶ | o.idp_name = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : ""; |
Branch: 2 branches
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| o.idp_name = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : ""; |
397 |
0 |
397 |
| o.idp_name = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : ""; |
397 |
0 |
397 |
|
| 46 |
397 |
| v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "entity_id"); |
| 47 |
397 |
▶ | if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
Branch: 2 branches
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
397 |
0 |
397 |
| if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
0 |
397 |
397 |
|
| 48 |
0 |
| croak("%s: Response->verify needs `entity_id`, this " |
| 49 |
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| "application's own", PSAML_WHO); |
| 50 |
397 |
| o.entity_id = SvPV_nolen(v); |
| 51 |
397 |
| v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "idp_entity_id"); |
| 52 |
397 |
▶ | if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
Branch: 2 branches
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
397 |
0 |
397 |
| if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
0 |
397 |
397 |
|
| 53 |
0 |
| croak("%s: Response->verify needs `idp_entity_id`, the " |
| 54 |
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| "provider's", PSAML_WHO); |
| 55 |
397 |
| o.idp_entity_id = SvPV_nolen(v); |
| 56 |
397 |
| v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "acs_url"); |
| 57 |
397 |
▶ | if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
Branch: 2 branches
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
397 |
0 |
397 |
| if (!v || !SvOK(v)) |
0 |
397 |
397 |
|
| 58 |
0 |
| croak("%s: Response->verify needs `acs_url`", PSAML_WHO); |
| 59 |
397 |
| o.acs_url = SvPV_nolen(v); |
| 60 |
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| |
| 61 |
397 |
| v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "certs"); |
| 62 |
397 |
▶ | if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV) |
Branch: 3 branches
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV) |
397 |
0 |
397 |
| if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV) |
397 |
0 |
397 |
| if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV) |
0 |
397 |
397 |
|
| 63 |
0 |
| croak("%s: Response->verify needs `certs`, an arrayref of the " |
| 64 |
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| "provider's signing certificates", PSAML_WHO); |
| 65 |
397 |
| o.keys = (AV *)SvRV(v); |
| 66 |
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| |
| 67 |
397 |
| v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "now"); |
| 68 |
397 |
▶ | o.now = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvIV(v) : (IV)time(NULL); |
Branch: 2 branches
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| o.now = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvIV(v) : (IV)time(NULL); |
45 |
352 |
397 |
| o.now = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvIV(v) : (IV)time(NULL); |
45 |
0 |
45 |
|
| 69 |
397 |
| o.skew = psaml_opt_iv(aTHX_ a, "skew", 120); |
| 70 |
397 |
| o.allow_sha1 = psaml_opt_bool(aTHX_ a, "allow_sha1", 0); |
| 71 |
397 |
| o.allow_idp_initiated = |
| 72 |
397 |
| psaml_opt_bool(aTHX_ a, "allow_idp_initiated", 0); |
| 73 |
397 |
| v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "require_signed"); |
| 74 |
442 |
▶ | o.require_signed = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : "either"; |
Branch: 2 branches
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| o.require_signed = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : "either"; |
45 |
352 |
397 |
| o.require_signed = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : "either"; |
45 |
0 |
45 |
|
| 75 |
397 |
| o.flow_id = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "in_response_to"); |
| 76 |
397 |
| o.seen_cb = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "seen"); |
| 77 |
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| |
| 78 |
397 |
| RETVAL = psaml_verify_response(aTHX_ bytes, &o); |
| 79 |
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| OUTPUT: |
| 80 |
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| RETVAL |
| 81 |
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| |
| 82 |
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| # _replayed($c, $seen, $identity, $skew): true if this assertion has been |
| 83 |
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| # presented before. |
| 84 |
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| # |
| 85 |
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| # The route's half of the replay check, and NOT part of verify: verify |
| 86 |
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| # takes its own `seen` coderef and has no application to find a cache in, |
| 87 |
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| # while this has a context and reaches the `cache` store through it. |
| 88 |
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| # |
| 89 |
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| # Croaks when it cannot tell. The ACS calls it under G_EVAL and turns |
| 90 |
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| # that into a `config` refusal, because a store that cannot be reached |
| 91 |
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| # must not produce the same login as an assertion that is fresh. |
| 92 |
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| IV |
| 93 |
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| _replayed(class, c, seen, identity, skew) |
| 94 |
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| SV *class |
| 95 |
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| SV *c |
| 96 |
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| SV *seen |
| 97 |
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| SV *identity |
| 98 |
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| IV skew |
| 99 |
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| CODE: |
| 100 |
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| PERL_UNUSED_VAR(class); |
| 101 |
185 |
▶ | RETVAL = psaml_replayed(aTHX_ c, seen, identity, skew); |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| RETVAL = psaml_replayed(aTHX_ c, seen, identity, skew); |
104 |
27 |
131 |
|
| 102 |
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| OUTPUT: |
| 103 |
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| RETVAL |
| 104 |
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| |
| 105 |
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| MODULE = Punk::SAML PACKAGE = Punk::SAML |
| 106 |
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| |
| 107 |
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| # Sign raw bytes, for the suite's fixture builder. The same gap phase 5 |
| 108 |
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| # hit from the other side: jws_abi signs arbitrary bytes but Crypt::JWS's |
| 109 |
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| # Perl surface only makes compact tokens, so a Perl harness that has to |
| 110 |
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| # produce an XML-DSig SignatureValue has no way in without this. |
| 111 |
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| SV * |
| 112 |
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| _sign_bytes(priv_pem, alg, input) |
| 113 |
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| SV *priv_pem |
| 114 |
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| SV *alg |
| 115 |
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| SV *input |
| 116 |
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| CODE: |
| 117 |
95 |
| const jws_abi *J = psaml_jws(aTHX); |
| 118 |
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| STRLEN pl, al, il; |
| 119 |
95 |
▶ | const char *pp = SvPVbyte(priv_pem, pl); |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| const char *pp = SvPVbyte(priv_pem, pl); |
95 |
0 |
95 |
|
| 120 |
95 |
▶ | const char *ap = SvPVbyte(alg, al); |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| const char *ap = SvPVbyte(alg, al); |
95 |
0 |
95 |
|
| 121 |
95 |
| const char *ip = SvPVbyte(input, il); |
| 122 |
95 |
| void *k = J->key_from_pem(aTHX_ pp, pl); |
| 123 |
95 |
▶ | if (!k) croak("%s: the private key will not parse", PSAML_WHO); |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if (!k) croak("%s: the private key will not parse", PSAML_WHO); |
0 |
95 |
95 |
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| 124 |
95 |
| RETVAL = J->sign(aTHX_ k, ap, al, (const unsigned char *)ip, il); |
| 125 |
95 |
| J->key_free(aTHX_ k); |
| 126 |
95 |
▶ | if (!RETVAL) croak("%s: signing failed", PSAML_WHO); |
Branch: 1 branch
| Branch | True | False | Total |
| if (!RETVAL) croak("%s: signing failed", PSAML_WHO); |
0 |
95 |
95 |
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| 127 |
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| OUTPUT: |
| 128 |
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| RETVAL |
| 129 |
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| |