xs/response.xs

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« include/psaml/psaml_boot.h ↑ Summary include/psaml/psaml_flow.h »
1 MODULE = Punk::SAML PACKAGE = Punk::SAML::Response
2  
3 # verify($bytes, %opts): the decoded XML in, an identity hashref out, or a
4 # Punk::SAML::Error thrown.
5 #
6 # No application and no request. The ACS route in phase 8 is a thin
7 # wrapper that supplies now, acs_url, entity_id, the keys and the flow
8 # from configuration; `punk saml verify` is another; and the suite is a
9 # third, running this a thousand times with none of the three.
10 SV *
11 verify(class, bytes, ...)
12 SV *class
13 SV *bytes
14 ALIAS:
15 _verify_field = 1
16 CODE:
17 HV *a;
18 psaml_checks o;
19 SV *v;
20 int i;
21 PERL_UNUSED_VAR(class);
22 378 ▶ if ((items - 2) % 2)
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if ((items - 2) % 2) 0 378 378
23 0 croak("%s: Response->verify takes bytes and a list of pairs",
24 PSAML_WHO);
25 378 a = newHV();
26 378 sv_2mortal((SV *)a);
27 2825 ▶ for (i = 2; i + 1 < items; i += 2) {
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for (i = 2; i + 1 < items; i += 2) { 2447 378 2825
28 STRLEN kl;
29 2447 const char *k = SvPV_const(ST(i), kl);
30 2447 (void)hv_store(a, k, (I32)kl, newSVsv(ST(i + 1)), 0);
31 }
32  
33 /* _verify_field is verify with the transport in front of it: the
34 * size cap on the ENCODED field, then the strict base64. It is an
35 * ALIAS rather than a wrapper that re-enters verify through
36 * call_method - the wrapper was written first, and pushing the
37 * caller\'s own arguments back onto the stack it was reading them
38 * from produced a freed-string panic. One body, two names. */
39 378 ▶ if (ix == 1)
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if (ix == 1) 21 357 378
40 21 bytes = sv_2mortal(psaml_decode_field(aTHX_ bytes,
41 psaml_opt_iv(aTHX_ a, "max_response", 262144)));
42  
43 378 Zero(&o, 1, psaml_checks);
44 378 v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "idp");
45 756 ▶ o.idp_name = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : "";
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o.idp_name = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : ""; 378 0 378
o.idp_name = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : ""; 378 0 378
46 378 v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "entity_id");
47 378 ▶ if (!v || !SvOK(v))
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if (!v || !SvOK(v)) 378 0 378
if (!v || !SvOK(v)) 0 378 378
48 0 croak("%s: Response->verify needs `entity_id`, this "
49 "application's own", PSAML_WHO);
50 378 o.entity_id = SvPV_nolen(v);
51 378 v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "idp_entity_id");
52 378 ▶ if (!v || !SvOK(v))
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if (!v || !SvOK(v)) 378 0 378
if (!v || !SvOK(v)) 0 378 378
53 0 croak("%s: Response->verify needs `idp_entity_id`, the "
54 "provider's", PSAML_WHO);
55 378 o.idp_entity_id = SvPV_nolen(v);
56 378 v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "acs_url");
57 378 ▶ if (!v || !SvOK(v))
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if (!v || !SvOK(v)) 378 0 378
if (!v || !SvOK(v)) 0 378 378
58 0 croak("%s: Response->verify needs `acs_url`", PSAML_WHO);
59 378 o.acs_url = SvPV_nolen(v);
60  
61 378 v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "certs");
62 378 ▶ if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV)
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if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV) 378 0 378
if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV) 378 0 378
if (!v || !SvROK(v) || SvTYPE(SvRV(v)) != SVt_PVAV) 0 378 378
63 0 croak("%s: Response->verify needs `certs`, an arrayref of the "
64 "provider's signing certificates", PSAML_WHO);
65 378 o.keys = (AV *)SvRV(v);
66  
67 378 v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "now");
68 378 ▶ o.now = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvIV(v) : (IV)time(NULL);
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o.now = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvIV(v) : (IV)time(NULL); 26 352 378
o.now = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvIV(v) : (IV)time(NULL); 26 0 26
69 378 o.skew = psaml_opt_iv(aTHX_ a, "skew", 120);
70 378 o.allow_sha1 = psaml_opt_bool(aTHX_ a, "allow_sha1", 0);
71 378 o.allow_idp_initiated =
72 378 psaml_opt_bool(aTHX_ a, "allow_idp_initiated", 0);
73 378 v = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "require_signed");
74 404 ▶ o.require_signed = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : "either";
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o.require_signed = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : "either"; 26 352 378
o.require_signed = (v && SvOK(v)) ? SvPV_nolen(v) : "either"; 26 0 26
75 378 o.flow_id = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "in_response_to");
76 378 o.seen_cb = psaml_hget(aTHX_ a, "seen");
77  
78 378 RETVAL = psaml_verify_response(aTHX_ bytes, &o);
79 OUTPUT:
80 RETVAL
81  
82 MODULE = Punk::SAML PACKAGE = Punk::SAML
83  
84 # Sign raw bytes, for the suite's fixture builder. The same gap phase 5
85 # hit from the other side: jws_abi signs arbitrary bytes but Crypt::JWS's
86 # Perl surface only makes compact tokens, so a Perl harness that has to
87 # produce an XML-DSig SignatureValue has no way in without this.
88 SV *
89 _sign_bytes(priv_pem, alg, input)
90 SV *priv_pem
91 SV *alg
92 SV *input
93 CODE:
94 82 const jws_abi *J = psaml_jws(aTHX);
95 STRLEN pl, al, il;
96 82 ▶ const char *pp = SvPVbyte(priv_pem, pl);
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const char *pp = SvPVbyte(priv_pem, pl); 82 0 82
97 82 ▶ const char *ap = SvPVbyte(alg, al);
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const char *ap = SvPVbyte(alg, al); 82 0 82
98 82 const char *ip = SvPVbyte(input, il);
99 82 void *k = J->key_from_pem(aTHX_ pp, pl);
100 82 ▶ if (!k) croak("%s: the private key will not parse", PSAML_WHO);
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if (!k) croak("%s: the private key will not parse", PSAML_WHO); 0 82 82
101 82 RETVAL = J->sign(aTHX_ k, ap, al, (const unsigned char *)ip, il);
102 82 J->key_free(aTHX_ k);
103 82 ▶ if (!RETVAL) croak("%s: signing failed", PSAML_WHO);
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if (!RETVAL) croak("%s: signing failed", PSAML_WHO); 0 82 82
104 OUTPUT:
105 RETVAL
106  
« include/psaml/psaml_boot.h ↑ Summary include/psaml/psaml_flow.h »